Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5073035 | Games and Economic Behavior | 2006 | 11 Pages |
Abstract
The Myerson's models on partial cooperation have been studied extensively [SIAM J. Discrete Math. 5 (1992) 305; Math. Methods Operations Res. 2 (1977) 225; Int. J. Game Theory 19 (1980) 421; 20 (1992) 255]. In [Game Econ. Behav. 26 (1999) 565], Hamiache proposes a new solution concept for communication situations. In this work, we analyze this value making some deficiencies clear and generalize this value to union stable cooperation structures emphasizing the differences in the extension.
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Authors
J.M. Bilbao, N. Jiménez, J.J. López,