Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5075824 | Information Economics and Policy | 2010 | 11 Pages |
Abstract
In this paper we analyse the roles of the government and an incumbent in preventing the entry of a pirate, who tries to avoid being caught. The framework of analysis used is a sequential duopoly model of vertical product differentiation with price competition. We find that both the government and the incumbent have key roles in preventing the entry of pirates. We show that the government will not help the incumbent to become a pure monopolist, even if it installs an antipiracy system. It will let the pirate enter either as a follower or a leader, or encourage the incumbent to set a low enough price to successfully deter the pirate from entering the market, depending on its technology for monitoring commercial piracy. Finally, we find that the pirate decides to become a leader to avoid being caught by the incumbent and the government.
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
Business, Management and Accounting
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Authors
Francisco Martı´nez-Sánchez,