| Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5078132 | International Journal of Industrial Organization | 2013 | 7 Pages |
Abstract
⺠We study alternative methods of assigning scarce resources to individuals who may be liquidity-constrained. ⺠Selling the resources via auctions is natural but leads to inefficiencies when agents are liquidity-constrained. ⺠Random assignment achieves higher utilitarian efficiency, if resale is allowed. ⺠Need-based assignment and lotteries with entry fees could also be desirable. ⺠The optimal mechanism displays features of the non-market schemes such as in-kind and cash subsidies.
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Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Yeon-Koo Che, Ian Gale, Jinwoo Kim,