| Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5086507 | Journal of Accounting and Economics | 2017 | 52 Pages |
Abstract
SEC oversight of publicly listed firms ranges from comment letter (CL) reviews of firms' reporting compliance to pursuing enforcement actions against violators. Prior literature finds that firm political connections (PC) negatively predict enforcement actions, inferring SEC capture. We present new evidence that firm PC positively predict CL reviews and substantive characteristics of such reviews, including the number of issues evaluated and the seniority of SEC staff involved. These results, robust to identification concerns, are inconsistent with SEC capture and indicate a more nuanced relation between firm PC and SEC oversight than previously suggested.
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Accounting
Authors
Jonas Heese, Mozaffar Khan, Karthik Ramanna,