| Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5086896 | Journal of Accounting and Economics | 2009 | 17 Pages |
Abstract
In this paper, we examine if corporate insiders have other motives for trading besides exploitation of private information. Our results show that insiders' portfolio re-balancing objectives, tax considerations and behavioral biases play the most important role in their trading decisions. We also find that insiders who have allocated a great (small) proportion of their wealth to insider stock sell more (less) before bad news earnings disclosures. Finally, insider selling is informative for future returns among those insiders who have the greatest proportion of wealth allocated to insider stocks.
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
Business, Management and Accounting
Accounting
Authors
Juha-Pekka Kallunki, Henrik Nilsson, Jörgen Hellström,