| Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5086994 | Journal of Accounting and Economics | 2006 | 41 Pages |
Abstract
We investigate whether firms with strong corporate governance benefit from higher credit ratings relative to firms with weaker governance. We document, after controlling for firm-specific risk characteristics, that credit ratings are negatively associated with the number of blockholders and CEO power, and positively related to takeover defenses, accrual quality, earnings timeliness, board independence, board stock ownership, and board expertise. We also provide evidence that CEOs of firms with speculative-grade credit ratings are overcompensated to a greater degree than their counterparts at firms with investment-grade ratings, thus providing one explanation for why some firms operate with weak governance.
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
Business, Management and Accounting
Accounting
Authors
Hollis Ashbaugh-Skaife, Daniel W. Collins, Ryan LaFond,