Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5093008 | Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics | 2006 | 15 Pages |
Abstract
The objective of this paper is to provide evidence on executive compensation for state dominated enterprises (SDEs) and non-state dominated enterprises (NSDEs) in China and on the compensation-performance relation for these two groups of companies. China provides a unique setting to evaluate the compensation-performance relation as executives of SDEs receive both pecuniary and non-pecuniary compensation, while executives of NSDEs receive relatively less non-pecuniary but greater pecuniary compensation. We predict that (i) the pecuniary compensation of executives of SDEs is lower than that of NSDE executives, and (ii) due to the non-scaleable nature of non-pecuniary compensation, there is no difference in the compensation-performance relation across SDEs and NSDEs. Our results confirm our predictions and are robust with respect to a number of sensitivity tests. This suggests that efficient governance choices may include both pecuniary and non-pecuniary compensation, with this being particularly important for firms in emerging capital markets.
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
Business, Management and Accounting
Business, Management and Accounting (General)
Authors
Zoltan Matolcsy, Peter Wells, Gerald Lee,