Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5100095 | Journal of Economic Theory | 2017 | 27 Pages |
Abstract
The existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in stochastic games is shown under a general condition called “(decomposable) coarser transition kernels”. This result covers various earlier existence results on correlated equilibria, noisy stochastic games, stochastic games with finite actions and state-independent transitions, and stochastic games with mixtures of constant transition kernels as special cases. A remarkably simple proof is provided via establishing a new connection between stochastic games and conditional expectations of correspondences. New applications of stochastic games are presented as illustrative examples, including stochastic games with endogenous shocks and a stochastic dynamic oligopoly model.
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Authors
Wei He, Yeneng Sun,