Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
560458 | Telecommunications Policy | 2008 | 7 Pages |
Abstract
This work extends the network competition model of Armstrong [(1998). Network interconnection in telecommunications. Economic Journal, 108, 545–564] and Laffont, Rey, and Tirole (1998). Network competition: I. Overview and nondiscriminatory pricing. RAND Journal of Economics, 29, 1–37] by assuming that operators can maintain a certain level of collusion in the unregulated retail market, and access prices may be regulated through non-linear tariffs. It emerges that, in the case of partially collusive environments, the regulator can design cost-based non-linear access charges such that the result is socially optimal.
Related Topics
Physical Sciences and Engineering
Computer Science
Information Systems
Authors
Macro Alderighi,