Model of collective cooperation and reallocation of benefits related to conflicts over water pollution across regional boundaries in a Chinese river basin

Serious transboundary conflicts over water pollution commonly arise from the environmental management of Chinese river basins adopting the current model of proportional share of pollution reduction (MPSPR). This paper discusses problems with the current MPSPR and then proposes a new model. Based on four assumptions, including the assumption that pollutant discharge or transfer within the river basin is highly controlled by individual administrative regions, a descriptive model of transboundary water pollution was developed for a typical Chinese river basin. Based on the above assumptions and the descriptive model, the author developed a model of collective cooperation and reallocation of benefits (MCCRB) to solve transboundary conflicts. MCCRB comprises two interacting parts. First, the administrator of the river basin calculates an optimal pollutant reduction allocation for the whole basin that meets water quality standards at the minimum cost to the environment. Second, the administrator finds an agreeable mechanism for benefit allocation that encourages each region to cooperate in reducing pollution. The first part is the basis for the MCCRB; the second encourages effective implementation of the optimal share of pollutant reduction by each region. MCCRB seeks an optimal solution for the whole basin rather than a particular region. Theoretical analysis and a case study for Chinese Huaihe River Basin suggest that the MCCRB is superior to the MPSPR: it decreases the total environmental cost (1995–1997) by USD$ 9,479,000, and increases resource utilization efficiency (1995–1997) by 33.4%. Findings of the paper will be helpful in designing an environmental policy that solves conflicts over water pollution across regional boundaries in Chinese river basin. However, some factors that affect the MCCRB must be considered by the administrator of the river basin.