Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5775635 | Applied Mathematics and Computation | 2017 | 17 Pages |
Abstract
The problem of consistency of a solution over time remains an important issue in cooperative dynamic games. Payoffs to players prescribed by an inconsistent solution may not be achievable since such a solution is extremely sensitive to its revision in the course of a game developing along an agreed upon cooperative behavior. The paper proposes a strong time-consistent payment scheme which is stable to a revision of cooperative set solutions, e.g., the core. Using a linear transformation of the solution, it becomes possible to obtain non-negative payments to players. In the paper, we also deal with a limit linear transformation of the solution whose convergence is proved. Developing a non-negative strong time-consistent payment scheme in a closed form, we guarantee that the solution supported by the scheme will not be revised over time.
Related Topics
Physical Sciences and Engineering
Mathematics
Applied Mathematics
Authors
Leon Petrosyan, Artem Sedakov, Hao Sun, Genjiu Xu,