Leakage resilient ID-based proxy re-encryption scheme for access control in fog computing

In fog computing, fog-devices are usually physically close to end-devices, and have a high speed connection with cloud servers. They provide good access control service for end-devices to cloud, if an ID-based proxy re-encryption scheme is deployed on them. Each file stored on a cloud server is encrypted using a symmetric key, and these keys are encrypted by a public master key which is stored in a fog-device. If an end-device want to access a file in cloud, then the fog-device re-encrypts these encapsulated symmetric keys from the master key to the key of the end-device. However, due to the geographic dispersion of fog-devices, they are apt to be attacked by side channel attacks. In this work, we propose a leakage resilient ID-based proxy re-encryption scheme in auxiliary input model. It can resist the continuous leakage of secret keys caused by side channel attacks. We implement our scheme over two platforms, and the results show that our scheme is feasible in practice.