Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
6896185 | European Journal of Operational Research | 2016 | 15 Pages |
Abstract
This paper seeks to determine how the double marginalization phenomenon affects the tradeoff between polluting emissions and abatement activities related to pollution accumulation in a supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one retailer. The environmental consequence of this inefficiency, which emerges in a non-cooperative vertical setting governed by a single-parameter contract, is overlooked in the literature on pollution control. In the setup of a two-stage game, we investigate the impact of double marginalization for non-cooperative equilibrium. To check whether there are differences between dynamic and strategic effects of double marginalization on pollution accumulation, both the open-loop and feedback Nash equilibria are derived over a finite time horizon, with the cooperative solution as a benchmark.
Keywords
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Physical Sciences and Engineering
Computer Science
Computer Science (General)
Authors
Fouad El Ouardighi, Jeong Eun Sim, Bowon Kim,