How to restrain participants opt out in shared parking market? A fair recurrent double auction approach

We propose a fair recurrent double VCG (FRD-VCG) auction mechanism to approach the emerging shared parking management problem. In a given shared parking environment with a parking management platform and a double-side perspective, the proposed mechanism considers how to restrain the potential participants (parking slot demanders and slot suppliers) opt out, which is based on the participants' priority attributes and are calculated with respect to historic auction records provided by the parking platform. Participants' fairness bids are then generated combining their priority attributes and their submitted bids (bid price and parking time) with the support of a novel evaluation function, which integrates priority attributes, bid price and parking time into an output value. The parking slot allocation rule and transaction payment rule are further designed to dealing with these issues include winner determination and price setting, respectively. Simulations show advantages of the proposed FRD-VCG mechanism, i.e., comparing with the double VCG (D-VCG) mechanism for the shared parking management problem where priority attributes and evaluation function are not considered, the proposed FRD-VCG mechanism has the potential to persuade participants to remain in the market whilst it improves the market's retention rate, the parking slot's utilization rate and the participants' utilities.