Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
7359223 | Journal of Economic Theory | 2018 | 37 Pages |
Abstract
We characterize the equilibrium set of a two-good, pure-credit economy with limited commitment, under both pairwise and centralized meetings. We show that the set of equilibria derived under “not-too-tight” solvency constraints (Alvarez and Jermann, 2000) commonly used in the literature is of measure zero in the whole set of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. There exist a continuum of stationary equilibria, a continuum of endogenous credit cycles of any periodicity, and a continuum of sunspot equilibria, irrespective of the assumed trading mechanism. Equilibria featuring “too-tight” solvency constraints can generate growing credit limits over time, periodic credit shutdowns, and heterogeneous debt limits across ex-ante identical borrowers. Moreover, we provide examples of credit cycles that dominate, from a social welfare point of view, all equilibria with “not-too-tight” solvency constraints.
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Authors
Zachary Bethune, Tai-Wei Hu, Guillaume Rocheteau,