| Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7361842 | Journal of Financial Economics | 2018 | 67 Pages |
Abstract
I present and estimate a dynamic model of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation and effort provision. I find that variation in CEO attributes explains the majority of variation in compensation (equity and total) but little of the variation in firm value. The primary drivers of cross-sectional compensation are risk aversion and influence on the board. Additionally, I estimate the magnitude of CEO agency issues. Removing CEO influence increases shareholder value in the typical firm by 1.74%, making CEOs risk neutral increases shareholder value by 16.12%, and removing all agency frictions increases shareholder value by 28.99%.
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Accounting
Authors
T. Beau Page,