Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
7397103 | Energy Policy | 2018 | 8 Pages |
Abstract
In this paper, as an alternative to public subsidies, we propose and assess the opportunity to implement Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) where the public regulator plays a more active role in the investment choice. Precisely, we model the decision-making process through a Nash bargaining procedure between public and private actors. We end up with two main results: (i) compared to public subsidies, the use of PPPs leads to higher outcomes/performances and allows governments to overcome incompleteness in contracts; (ii) PPPs are optimally chosen only when there is a fair allocation of the bargaining power between the two sides and when bargaining procedures are not perceived as being too lengthy or costly.
Related Topics
Physical Sciences and Engineering
Energy
Energy Engineering and Power Technology
Authors
Marco Buso, Anne Stenger,