Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
7414653 | The British Accounting Review | 2018 | 43 Pages |
Abstract
This study examines the relationship between CEO risk-taking incentives, measured by the sensitivity of CEO wealth held in options to a change in stock return volatility or Vega, and socially irresponsible activities using a large sample of U.S. firms during the period 1992-2012. Our results for the period before the 2007 financial crisis suggest that CEO risk-taking incentives are positively related to socially irresponsible activities. In addition, we find that a firm's socially responsible actions may act as a moderator, strengthening the aforementioned relationship. The results after the 2007 financial crisis show no evidence of a significant relationship between CEO risk-taking incentives and socially irresponsible activities. This could be due to the increased scrutiny regarding compensation packages and the increased role of reputational issues in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Our results suggest that risk-taking incentives embedded in the CEO compensation scheme have implications for corporate policies toward socially irresponsible activities.
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
Business, Management and Accounting
Accounting
Authors
Kais Bouslah, José Liñares-Zegarra, Bouchra M'Zali, Bert Scholtens,