Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
7426322 | Journal of Family Business Strategy | 2017 | 11 Pages |
Abstract
Based on agency theory, this study analyzes whether family firms are more compliant with corporate governance recommendations than non-family firms in the context of emerging markets. Using a unique sample of 826 observations of the highest ranked companies on the stock exchange indices of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico during the period 2004-2010, we hypothesize that family firms may adopt better corporate governance practices to substitute for the absence or inefficiency of a regulatory system and to mitigate the agency problem between majority and minority shareholders. Additionally, we propose a corporate governance compliance index considering the legal and institutional framework of the region. The empirical results indicate that family firms report a higher corporate governance index. We find that board composition (independence, size and COB-CEO duality) does not moderate corporate governance compliance of family firms but rather such variables have a direct effect on the corporate governance index.
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Authors
Guadalupe del Carmen Briano-Turrent, Jannine Poletti-Hughes,