Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
7427857 | Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review | 2018 | 16 Pages |
Abstract
Customer balking exists in many industries, and would significantly impact the supply chain management. We consider trade credit, customer balking behavior and market information asymmetry and information sharing in a two-level supply chain. Stackelberg equilibriums are derived in each scenario, respectively. The wholesale price and order quantity at equilibrium decrease (increase) in balking threshold (balking probability) when the production cost is not relatively low. The retailer benefits from the manufacturer's pessimism with information asymmetry, while the optimism with information sharing. However, information asymmetry always harms the manufacturer. We design an information-dependent-credit-limited contract to enforce the retailer to share information.
Related Topics
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Authors
Baofeng Zhang, Desheng Dash Wu, Liang Liang,