Effects of exclusion on acceptance in ultimatum games

In three-party ultimatum games, the proposer can first decide whether to exclude one responder, which increases the available pie. The experiments control for intentionality of exclusion and veto power of the third party. We do not find evidence for indirect reciprocity of the remaining responder after exclusion of the other. Similarly, not excluding the second responder is only insignificantly reciprocated by him. Overall, we find little evidence that intentional exclusion affects responder behavior.

► In three party (X, Y, Z) ultimatum games proposer X can decide to exclude responder Z. ► We control for intentionality of exclusion and veto power of the third party Z. ► We observe no indirect reciprocity of the remaining responder Y after exclusion of Z. ► Not excluding Z is mildly but not significantly reciprocated by Z. ► Overall intentional exclusion has little to no effects.