Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
885031 | Journal of Economic Psychology | 2010 | 12 Pages |
Abstract
This study analyses the behavior in a repeated public goods game when subjects know about the possibility of existence of strict conditional cooperators. We employed a baseline treatment and a threat treatment in which subjects are informed about the possibility of being in a group together with automata playing a grim trigger strategy. We conjecture the resulting game allows for almost fully efficient outcomes. Contributions in the threat treatment increase by 40% before a surprise restart, and by 50% after the surprise restart. In line with the grim trigger strategy subjects contribute either all or nothing in the threat treatment.
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Authors
Pablo Guillen, Enrique Fatas, Pablo Brañas-Garza,