Envy and loss aversion in tournaments

Tournaments require a large gap in prizes in order to induce incentives. The resulting unequal distribution suggests that monetary payoffs are not the only motive that determines agents’ decisions. In our experiment we test theoretical predictions about the role of envy and loss aversion in tournaments. Our results confirm that the limitation of inequity between subjects’ payments implies lower effort while the elimination of losses relative to expectations decreases the variance of effort. They suggest that envy and loss aversion drive behavior in tournaments. Moreover, we show that standard theory provides a good explanation for competitive behavior when envy and loss aversion do not play a role in the decision making process.

► We responded to all comments of reviewers and mainly addressed the following points. ► In the introduction, we discuss more the existing literature and we emphasize more our contribution. ► We explain in more detail issues relative to risk aversion. ► We make the results more precise in the analysis.