Article ID Journal Published Year Pages File Type
885094 Journal of Economic Psychology 2012 18 Pages PDF
Abstract

I study the behavior of individuals with present biased preferences who are involved in costly, long-run projects. By using generic cost and reward functions, I characterize the behaviors of the sophisticated, partial naive and naive types. It is shown that there may arise cases where naives needlessly put effort on projects they never complete. Moreover, in endogenous total cost projects, the naive types always end up completing projects of lesser quality than originally intended. By introducing a bonus motive, it is shown that agents with higher self-control problems should be given a higher bonus to prevent inefficient procrastination. I, then, characterize the behavior of partially naives who potentially learn self-preferences. It is found that without learning self-preferences, partial naives behave either like sophisticates or naives depending on the level of naivete; with learning, if the learning pace is fast enough, procrastination until the deadline does not occur.

► Naive individuals may needlessly put effort on projects they never complete. ► In endogenous cost projects, naives complete lesser quality projects than intended. ► Learning partial naives may not procrastinate until the deadline contrary to naives. ► Naives’ increasing awareness about self-preferences enhances the project quality.

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