Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
885124 | Journal of Economic Psychology | 2010 | 12 Pages |
Abstract
This paper investigates face-to-face lying and beliefs associated with it. In experiments in Sweden and Japan, subjects answer questions about personal characteristics, play a face-to-face sender–receiver game and participate in an elicitation of lie-detection beliefs. The previous finding of too much truth-telling (compared to the equilibrium prediction) also holds in the face-to-face setting. A new result is that although many people claim that they are good at lie-detection, few reveal belief in this ability when money is at stake. Correlations between the subjects’ characteristics and their behavior and performances in the game are also explored.
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Authors
Håkan J. Holm, Toshiji Kawagoe,