| Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 885188 | Journal of Economic Psychology | 2010 | 6 Pages |
Abstract
We examine the pricing decision of a multi-product monopolist in a two-sided market with capacity constraints where the type structure of buyers on one side is an important determinant of profit on the other side. Prices below the maximum sellout price and rationing demand in the first market might be optimal to reach a demand quality, i.e. a type distribution more favorable for sales in the second market. The model explains frequently observed underpricing and resale deterrence, e.g. in the (sports) entertainment industry, where the spectators’ extraversion is negatively related to their income and serves as an input factor for sponsors.
Keywords
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Social Sciences and Humanities
Business, Management and Accounting
Marketing
Authors
Christoph Eichhorn, Marco Sahm,