| Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 885457 | Journal of Economic Psychology | 2007 | 12 Pages |
Abstract
We study an ultimatum experiment in which the responder does not know the offer when accepting or rejecting. Unconditional veto power leads to acceptances, although proposers are significantly greedier than in standard ultimatum games, and this is anticipated by responders. We also elicit responders’ willingness to pay for (un)conditional veto power. The bids reveal a large endowment effect.
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Authors
Thomas Gehrig, Werner Güth, Vittoria Levati, Rene Levinsky, Axel Ockenfels, Tobias Uske, Torsten Weiland,