Reciprocal trust mediates deep transfer of learning between games of strategic interaction

We studied transfer of learning across two games of strategic interaction. We found that the interpersonal relation between two players during and across two games influence development of reciprocal trust and transfer of learning from one game to another. We show that two types of similarities between the games affect transfer: (1) deep similarities facilitate transfer of an optimal solution across games; (2) surface similarities can either facilitate or hinder transfer depending on whether they lead players toward an optimal or sub-optimal solution in the target game. Learning an optimal solution in a context of interdependence between players is associated with development of reciprocal trust, which in turn mediates transfer of learning across games. The results can be used to inform the design of training exercises to develop strategic interaction skills.

► We investigate transfer of learning across two games of strategic interaction. ► Deep-level similarities facilitate transfer of learning across games. ► Surface similarities can either facilitate or hinder transfer. ► Learning an optimal solution is associated with development of reciprocal trust. ► Reciprocal trust facilitates transfer of learning across games.