Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
9551846 | Games and Economic Behavior | 2005 | 18 Pages |
Abstract
A solution to bargaining problems is ordinal when it is covariant with respect to order-preserving transformations of utility. Shapley has constructed an ordinal, symmetric, efficient solution to three-player problems. Here, we extend Shapley's solution in two directions. First, we extend it to more than three players. Second, we show that this extension lends itself to the construction of a continuum of ordinal, symmetric, efficient solutions. The construction makes use of ordinal path-valued solutions that were suggested and studied by O'Neil et al. [Games Econ. Behav. 48 (2004) 139-153].
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Authors
Dov Samet, Zvi Safra,