Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
957189 | Journal of Economic Theory | 2012 | 18 Pages |
Abstract
An evolutionary style model of recontracting is given which guarantees convergence to core allocations of an underlying cooperative game. Unlike its predecessors in the evolution/learning literature, this is achieved without assumptions of convexity of the characteristic function or a reliance on random errors. The stochastic stability properties of the model are then examined and it is shown that stochastically stable states solve a simple and intuitive minimization problem which reduces to maximizing a Rawlsian SWF for a common class of utility functions. In contrast to previous analyses, the stochastically stable state is unique for a broad class of utility functions.
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Authors
Jonathan Newton,