Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
959469 | Journal of Financial Economics | 2014 | 19 Pages |
Abstract
The Split-Share Structure Reform granted legitimate trading rights to the state-owned shares of listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs), opening up the gate to China׳s secondary privatization. The expectation of privatization quickly boosted SOE output, profits, and employment, but did not change their operating efficiency and corporate governance. The improvements to SOE performance are positively correlated to government agents’ privatization-led incentive of increasing state-owned share value. In terms of privatization methodology, the reform adopted a market mechanism that played an effective information discovery role in aligning the interests of the government and public investors.
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Authors
Li Liao, Bibo Liu, Hao Wang,