Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
959622 | Journal of Financial Economics | 2011 | 16 Pages |
We examine chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, CEO retention policies, and mergers and acquisition (M&A) decisions in firms in which founders serve as a director with a nonfounder CEO (founder-director firms). We find that founder-director firms offer a different mix of incentives to their CEOs than other firms. Pay-for-performance sensitivity for nonfounder CEOs in founder-director firms is higher and the level of pay is lower than that of other CEOs. CEO turnover sensitivity to firm performance is also significantly higher in founder-director firms compared with nonfounder firms. Overall, the evidence suggests that boards with founder-directors provide more high-powered incentives in the form of pay and retention policies than the average US board. Stock returns around M&A announcements and board attendance are also higher in founder-director firms compared with nonfounder firms.
► This paper examines corporate governance decisions when founders are on the board. ► We find that boards with founder-directors provide more high-powered CEO incentives. ► Founder-director firms also make better M&As and have higher board attendance rates.