| Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 959844 | Journal of Financial Economics | 2009 | 11 Pages |
Abstract
The “Lake Wobegon Effect,” which is widely cited as a potential cause for rising CEO pay, is said to occur because no firm wants to admit to having a CEO who is below average, and so no firm allows its CEO's pay package to lag market expectations. We develop a game-theoretic model of this Effect. In our model, a CEO's wage may serve as a signal of match surplus, and therefore affect the value of the firm. We compare equilibria of our model to a full-information case and derive conditions under which equilibrium wages are distorted upward.
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Authors
Rachel M. Hayes, Scott Schaefer,