Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
9657231 | The Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming | 2005 | 30 Pages |
Abstract
A contract signing protocol lets two parties exchange digital signatures on a pre-agreed text. Optimistic contract signing protocols enable the signers to do so without invoking a trusted third party. However, an adjudicating third party remains available should one or both signers seek timely resolution. We analyze optimistic contract signing protocols using a game-theoretic approach and prove a fundamental impossibility result: in any fair, optimistic, timely protocol, an optimistic player yields an advantage to the opponent. The proof relies on a careful characterization of optimistic play that postpones communication to the third party.
Related Topics
Physical Sciences and Engineering
Computer Science
Computational Theory and Mathematics
Authors
Rohit Chadha, John C. Mitchell, Andre Scedrov, Vitaly Shmatikov,