Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
973889 | Pacific-Basin Finance Journal | 2008 | 19 Pages |
Abstract
To discuss the role of bank-dispatched directors in the governance of Japanese firms, it has to be noted that the board is heterogeneous and only senior directors, including presidents and managing directors, are likely involved in major management decisions. With a panel of about 1150 firms in 1990–98, we find that, when bank loans constitute a significant portion of the firm's assets, the low industry-adjusted profitability increases the probability that a new (or additional) director is dispatched from the bank at a senior level but not at a junior level. This dispatch improves the firm's performance provided it does not merely replace the predecessor.
Keywords
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Takuji Saito, Hiroyuki Odagiri,