Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
975795 | Pacific-Basin Finance Journal | 2007 | 24 Pages |
Abstract
For 174 large Japanese corporations during 1992–1996, we find that top executive pay is higher in firms with weaker corporate governance mechanisms, controlling for standard economic determinants of pay. We use management ownership and family control (“the ownership mechanisms”), and keiretsu affiliation, the presence of outside directors, and board size (“the monitoring mechanisms”) to measure corporate governance mechanisms. We also find that the excess pay related to ownership and monitoring variables is negatively associated with subsequent accounting performance, consistent with the presence of an agency problem. We do not, however, find an association between this excess pay and subsequent stock returns.
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Sudipta Basu, Lee-Seok Hwang, Toshiaki Mitsudome, Joseph Weintrop,