Article ID Journal Published Year Pages File Type
985164 Research Policy 2012 16 Pages PDF
Abstract

Venture capitalists (VCs) fund the development of promising inventions to turn them into marketable innovations. During this development stage portfolio firms are likely to garner even more inventions at least until the product is fully developed. Once the product is fully developed the focus shifts from development to sales so the number of generated inventions should decrease. This behavior implies that VCs are likely to spur invention according to an inverted U-shape over time. We empirically examine whether patent trajectories are consistent with this hypothesized inverted U-shape using a self-collected dataset containing 233 VC-backed firms and a large set of controls operating in Spain. We find that firms’ patenting activity increases after VC investments. This increase is substantially more pronounced the first two years following VC investments, i.e., patent trajectories follow an inverted U-shape over time. Our more demanding specifications suggest that the sharp increase in patenting right after VCs’ investments is caused by a positive treatment effect over and beyond any likely selection effect. Moreover, we defend that the increase in patenting is not just due to the fact that VCs give money so that firms can patent pre-VC inventions, but also to the fact that VCs fund the development of inventions.

► VCs fund the development of promising inventions to turn them into marketable innovations. ► VCs are likely to spur invention according to an inverted U-shape over time. ► Empirically examine if patent trajectories are consistent with this inverted U-shape. ► Sample including 233 VC-funded firms and a set of controls operating in Spain. ► Patent trajectories follow an inverted U-shape over time after first round VC investments.

Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities Business, Management and Accounting Business and International Management
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