| Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1032833 | Omega | 2012 | 13 Pages |
We examine a manufacturer's pricing strategies in a dual-channel supply chain, in which the manufacturer is a Stackelberg leader and the retailer is a follower. We show the conditions under which the manufacturer and the retailer both prefer a dual-channel supply chain. We examine the coordination schemes for a dual-channel supply chain and find that a manufacturer's contract with a wholesale price and a price for the direct channel can coordinate the dual-channel supply channel, benefiting the retailer but not the manufacturer. We illustrate how such a contract with a complementary agreement, such as a two-part tariff or a profit-sharing agreement, can coordinate the dual-channel supply chain and enable both the manufacturer and the retailer to be a win–win.
► We examine a Stackelberg manufacturer's pricing strategies in a dual-channel supply chain. ► Conditions under which the manufacturer and the retailer both prefer a dual-channel are indentified. ► Coordination scheme for a dual-channel supply chain is proposed. ► With complementary agreements, coordinating contracts can enable a win–win in a dual-channel.
