Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
10368018 | Decision Support Systems | 2005 | 11 Pages |
Abstract
Voting systems with several levels of approval in the input and output are considered in this paper. That means games with nâ¥2 players, jâ¥2 ordered qualitative alternatives in the input level and kâ¥2 possible ordered quantitative alternatives in the output. We introduce the Shapley-Shubik power index notion when passing from ordinary simple games or ternary voting games with abstention to this wider class of voting systems. The pivotal role of players is analysed by means of several examples and an axiomatization in the spirit of Shapley and Dubey is given for the proposed power index.
Related Topics
Physical Sciences and Engineering
Computer Science
Information Systems
Authors
Josep Freixas,