Development and mechanistic explanation

Within modern philosophy of biology the topic of mechanistic explanation has become a central theme for critical discussion. The neo-mechanical philosophers have developed accounts that emphasize intervention and manipulation as the central epistemic tools that allow gaining epistemic access upon the mechanisms and have argued that the processes of inter-field integration across disciplines can be understood through the analysis of mechanisms spanning multiple levels. In this paper I revisit current proposals on mechanistic explanation in order to show some of their limitations when dealing with developmental mechanisms. I basically argue that (i) developmental mechanisms cannot be accommodated within a framework centered upon the mutual manipulation principle, (ii) the distinction between causal relations vs. constitutive relations cannot be easily demarcated within developmental biology and (iii) the notion of “part” underlying the neo-mechanical accounts on explanation is not suitable for developmental biology.

► I analyze the limitations of mechanistic explanations when dealing with development. ► I confront current proposals with an example: Xenopus axes formation. ► The ontological limitations are tracked to a restricted conception of “part”. ► The epistemological limitations are tracked to the principle of mutual manipulation. ► I claim we should understand scientific explanations as epistemic access providers.