The negative view of natural selection

An influential argument due to Elliott Sober, subsequently strengthened by Denis Walsh and Joel Pust, moves from plausible premises to the bold conclusion that natural selection cannot explain the traits of individual organisms. If the argument were sound, the explanatory scope of selection would depend, surprisingly, on metaphysical considerations concerning origin essentialism. I show that the Sober-Walsh-Pust argument rests on a flawed counterfactual criterion for explanatory relevance. I further show that a more defensible criterion for explanatory relevance recently proposed by Michael Strevens lends support to the view that natural selection can be relevant to the explanation of individual traits.

► The Negative View states that selection never explains the instantiation of a trait by an individual. ► The primary argument for the Negative View rests on an assumption about contrastive explanation. ► This assumption is flawed. ► A more defensible picture of contrastive explanation challenges the Negative View.