Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
436305 | Theoretical Computer Science | 2014 | 12 Pages |
We study double auction market design where the market maker wants to maximize its total revenue by buying low from the sellers and selling high to the buyers. We consider a Bayesian setting where buyers and sellers have independent probability distributions on the values of products on the market.For the simplest setting, each seller has one kind of indivisible good with a bounded (integer) amount that can be sold to a buyer, who may demand a bounded number of copies. We develop a maximum mechanism for the market maker to maximize its own revenue.For the more general case where each seller's product may be different, we consider a number of variants in terms of constraints on supplies and demands. For each of them, we develop a polynomial time computable truthful mechanism for the market maker to achieve a revenue at least a constant α times the revenue of any other truthful mechanism.