| Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4491451 | Agricultural Systems | 2011 | 8 Pages |
The Livestock Gross Margin Insurance for Dairy Cattle is a federally reinsured insurance program that enables US dairy producers to establish minimum levels of milk income net of feed cost. Given the structure of this program there are an infinite number of possible contract designs based on the choice of deductible level and proportion of production insured. Adding to this complexity, producers vary in their risk preferences, which affect the incentive to insure their margin. It is unclear as to how producers may adopt this program for revenue risk management. This paper investigates the interplay between producer risk preferences, contract design and the subsidization of premium in determining program coverage. We undertook this analysis within an expected utility framework. Optimal contracts under different rates of constant relative rate of risk aversion and subsidies were analyzed using a nonlinear optimization model. We found that total optimal coverage increased significantly with the level of risk of aversion at lower deductibles but as deductible level increased, the level of risk aversion had a lesser impact on total optimal coverages. As expected, at the same deductible and risk aversion levels, inclusion of a premium subsidy increased the total optimal coverage.
► Expected utility maximization help to understand LGM-Dairy farmer risk aversion. ► The LGM-Dairy coverage increases with the risk aversion level. ► Optimal LGM-Dairy coverage increased as deductible increased. ► Premium subsidization increased significantly the optimal LGM-Dairy coverages.
