Price–bandwidth dynamics for WSPs in heterogeneous wireless networks

This paper presents a comprehensive approach to spectrum pricing and bandwidth management for wireless service providers (WSPs) in heterogeneous wireless networks. Most approaches to spectrum management focus on revenue maximization for the WSPs. However, the key issue of the competitive edge held by a WSP over the others (i.e., its market share) is hardly addressed. The market shares of the WSPs depend on the prices they advertise and the bandwidths they provide. We develop a three phase game between WSPs. The first phase called the WSP–WSP price game enables WSPs determine the optimal price they must advertise. In the second phase, called the WSP–WSP bandwidth game, the WSPs use the Nash equilibrium of the WSP–WSP price game, to determine the optimal bandwidths they should advertise in order to maximize their market share. Finally, in the third phase, we develop a WSP–WSP trading game model the fact that users that start off with a WSP can not only demand bandwidth from that WSP, but also demand bandwidth from other WSPs in order to make best use of the available bandwidth at all the WSPs.