Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
6858215 | Information Sciences | 2014 | 13 Pages |
Abstract
In this paper we describe a cryptanalysis of a key exchange scheme recently proposed by Álvarez, Tortosa, Vicent and Zamora. The scheme is based on exponentiation of block matrices over a finite field of prime order, and its security is claimed to rely in the hardness of a discrete logarithm problem in a subgroup of GLn(p). However, the proposal's design allows for a clean attack strategy which exploits the fact that exponents are at some point added instead of multiplied as in a standard Diffie-Hellman construction. This strategy is moreover successful for a much more general choice of parameters than that put forward by Álvarez et al.
Related Topics
Physical Sciences and Engineering
Computer Science
Artificial Intelligence
Authors
MarÃa Isabel González Vasco, Angel L. Pérez del Pozo, Pedro Taborda Duarte, Jorge L. Villar,