Biases in children’s and adults’ moral judgments

Two experiments examined biases in children’s (5/6- and 7/8-year-olds) and adults’ moral judgments. Participants at all ages judged that it was worse to produce harm when harm occurred (a) through action rather than inaction (omission bias), (b) when physical contact with the victim was involved (physical contact principle), and (c) when the harm was produced as a direct means to an end rather than as an unintended but foreseeable side effect of the action (intention principle). The youngest participants, however, did not incorporate benefit when making judgments about situations in which harm to one individual resulted in benefit to five individuals. Older participants showed some preference for benefit resulting from action (commission) as opposed to inaction (omission). The findings are discussed in the context of the theory that moral judgments result, in part, from the operation of an inherent, intuitive moral faculty compared with the theory that moral judgments require development of necessary cognitive abilities.

► Two experiments on biases in children’s and adults’ moral judgments. ► Worse to harm when only harm occurred through action rather than inaction. ► Worse to harm when physical contact with the victim was involved. ► Worse to harm when it’s a means to an end, not as a side effect of the action. ► Young children do not incorporate benefit when harm and benefit occur.