کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
1003966 | 937718 | 2013 | 12 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
We use panel-data threshold models to examine the non-uniform relation between Chief Executive Officer (CEO) equity-based compensation and earnings-based performance. Prior studies examining this very issue have arbitrarily adopted various exogenous criteria to partition the sample, and thus the inferences could be misleading. To address this issue, we employ the threshold regression models that allow the data itself to endogenously generate several regimes identified by the thresholds. Our empirical results show that not only is the positive impact of CEO equity incentives on firm performance more pronounced for companies with lower and moderate levels of CEO stock-based incentive pay, but also for less-profitable firms. The results are consistent with the position that excessive equity-based awards are unable to benefit firm performance, and that share-based compensation is more effective for start-up firms with low profit.
Journal: The British Accounting Review - Volume 45, Issue 3, September 2013, Pages 203–214