کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
1004356 | 1481871 | 2015 | 15 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Career concerns, shareholder monitoring and investment efficiency: From the perspective of compensation contract rigidity in Chinese SOEs
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری
حسابداری
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
چکیده انگلیسی
This paper presents theoretical analysis of how career concerns and shareholder monitoring affect chief executive officer (CEO) agency costs. We investigate investment efficiency prior to CEO retirement based on a sample of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) during the 1999–2007 period and find that there is a significant decline in investment efficiency prior to CEO retirement, relative to other periods, and that this decline becomes less significant under stronger shareholder supervision. Our research furthers understanding of the significance of SOE incentive and monitoring mechanisms.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: China Journal of Accounting Research - Volume 8, Issue 1, March 2015, Pages 59–73
Journal: China Journal of Accounting Research - Volume 8, Issue 1, March 2015, Pages 59–73
نویسندگان
Hualin Wan, Kai Zhu, Xinyuan Chen,