کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
10522733 | 955836 | 2005 | 26 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
The generalized Nash equilibrium model for oligopolistic transit market with elastic demand
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
علوم تصمیم گیری
علوم مدیریت و مطالعات اجرایی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
چکیده انگلیسی
This paper presents a bilevel transit fare equilibrium model for a deregulated transit system. In the upper-level problem, the transit competition is portrayed as an n-player, non-cooperative game by changing the fare structure of each of a set of transit lines separately so as to maximize the profit of each transit operator within the oligopolistic market. We show that there exists a generalized Nash game between transit operators, which can be formulated as a quasi-variational inequality problem. In the lower-level problem, the passengers' response to the equilibrium fare structure of the transit operators is represented by the stochastic user equilibrium transit assignment model with elastic OD demand. As a result, the bilevel transit fare equilibrium problem is presented in the Stackelberg form and solved by a heuristic solution algorithm based on a sensitivity analysis approach. A numerical example is given to illustrate the competition mechanism on the transit network and some useful findings are presented on competitive operations.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Transportation Research Part B: Methodological - Volume 39, Issue 6, July 2005, Pages 519-544
Journal: Transportation Research Part B: Methodological - Volume 39, Issue 6, July 2005, Pages 519-544
نویسندگان
Jing Zhou, William H.K. Lam, Benjamin G. Heydecker,