کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
1160318 | 1490323 | 2016 | 7 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
• The no-miracles argument is reducible to a set of all scientific arguments.
• What counts is not merely different evidence but better evidence.
• We should evaluate scientific theories not collectively but individually.
Extensional scientific realism is the view that each believable scientific theory is supported by the unique first-order evidence for it and that if we want to believe that it is true, we should rely on its unique first-order evidence. In contrast, intensional scientific realism is the view that all believable scientific theories have a common feature and that we should rely on it to determine whether a theory is believable or not. Fitzpatrick argues that extensional realism is immune, while intensional realism is not, to the pessimistic induction. I reply that if extensional realism overcomes the pessimistic induction at all, that is because it implicitly relies on the theoretical resource of intensional realism. I also argue that extensional realism, by nature, cannot embed a criterion for distinguishing between believable and unbelievable theories.
Journal: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A - Volume 59, October 2016, Pages 46–52